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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY UNDER 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A: 
"DON'T THROW THE BABY OUT WITH THE 
BATHWATER" 
Honorable George C. Pratt: 
Professor Henderson, I believe, has demonstrated the bewilder- 
ing nature of the problems that surround products liability. Our 
next speaker is Professor Stuart Madden. 
Professor M. Stuart Madden*: 
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak at this symposium. 
My colleagues on this panel include lawyers, teachers and authors 
who have shaped, and who will continue to shape, modem prod- 
ucts liability law. 
I believe that the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A1 
and its erudite accompanying comments have performed yeo- 
* Professor M. Stuart Madden, Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor, 
Pace University School of Law; B.A., 1971, University of Pennsylvania; 
M.A., 1972, London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., 1976, 
Georgetown University Law Center. Some of his publications include: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993); TOXIC TORTS DESKBOOK 
(1992); Issue Preclusion in Products Liabilify, 11 PACE L. REV. 87 (1990). 
1. RESTATE~~ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 9 402A (1965) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition u m n u b l y  
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, 
and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The ruIe stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product, and 
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man's work in leading modem products liability law through its 
first thirty years, and have permitted development of broad areas 
of consensus as to the types of product risks and injuries that 
should import seller l i a b i l i t ~ . ~  As  a result, I believe that the cur- 
rent initiative of the American Law Institute (A.L.I.)3 to prepare 
a Restatement of products liability should properly assign sub- 
stantial deference to the language and structure of such interpre- 
tive comments to the current section 402A as have proved suc- 
cessful in promoting a rational, progressive, and moderately 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relationship with the seller. 
Id. 
2. Case law interpretation has not been uniform, however. Corrrpare 
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446-47 (Cal. 1978) (holding that a 
plaintiff with a strict product liability claim need not prove that the product 
was "unreasonably dangerous") with Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 
P.2d 1033, 1036-38 (Or. 1976) (requiring that a product be unreasonably 
dangerous for a manufacturer to be strictly liable, stressing that such a test 
does not confuse the distinction between strict liability and negligence). See 
gerierally Joseph A. Page, Gerieric Product Risks: 7he C u e  Against Cornrttertt 
k artd For Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y .U. L. REV. 853 (1983). The first 
decision to hold manufacturers strictly liable in tort for defective products was 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). Since this 
decision, scores of courts have followed the holding enumerated in Greerirttarr 
and "codified" by Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 402A. See, e.g., Kaiser 
Aluminum and Chem. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 981 F.2d 136, 143 
(4th Cir. 1992) (noting Greeriman as the "promulgation . . . of the modem 
doctrine of strict liability in tort . . . ."); Westric Battery Co. v. Standard 
Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307, 1315 (10th Cir. 1973) (stating that "[olut of the 
Greenman v. Yuba decision emerged 5 402A of the Restatement of the Law of 
Torts 2d . . . ."); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277 
(8th Cir. 1972) (recognizing "Justice Traynor's opinion in the Greerrrrtan case" 
as the foremost authority explicating the doctrine of strict liability). 
3. The American Law Institute (A.L.I.) began with the formation of n 
committee made up of legal scholars such as Benjamin Cardom, Arthur 
Corbin, Learned Hand, Harlan Stone and John Wigmore. In 1923, this 
committee organized the A.L.I. for the purpose of establishing a "Restatement 
of the Law" to deal with the rising complexity of American Law. The A.L.I. 
adopted 5 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965 and is now in 
the process of drafting the Restatement (Third) of Torts. See generally Herbert 
F. Goodrich, 7he Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. L. REV. 
283 (1951). 
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uniform interpretation of seller liability for harm caused by de- 
fective pr~ducts .~  
In a practical vein, however, I must recognize that there exists 
a seeming majority of experts in the field who believe that strict 
tort liability is but a chimera that hides de facto negligence 
analy~is.~ Thus, in the spirit of compromise and pragmatism, I 
gave some thought to whether true strict products liability serves 
a more socially beneficial role in some types of product claims 
than it does in others. If the answer to that question is yes, it 
follows that serious consideration should be given to creating a 
residual domain of strict products liability for such claims, while 
surrendering its applicability in others. 
Regarding the first question: "Are there types of products or 
product claims in which strict products liability serves a role in 
the satisfaction of agreed upon tort principles?" My consideration 
leads me to conclude that the answer is yes, and that those claim 
categories can be described in this way: putting aside alcohol, to- 
bacco products, prescription pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 
4. Cf: James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed 
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Seco~rd) of Torrs, 77 CORNELL . 
REV. 1512, 1536 (1992) (proposing that "courts should not review the 
adequacy of prescription drug designs. . . ."); Kim D. Larsen, Note, Strict 
Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Deject: An Economic 
Analysis, 84 Co~uhf. L. REV. 2045, 2056-67 (1984) (stating that 
manufacturers should not be liable for accidents arising from the use of a 
product for which there is no alternative design). But see Keith Miller, Design 
Defct Litigation in Iowa: Ihe Myths of Strict Liability, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 
465, 469-70 (1991) (stating that due to the limited types of products discussed 
in the 3 402A comments, "a court that has adopted § 402A can draw little 
support from the comments and must develop the meaning of strict liability on 
its own. . . ."). 
5. See, e.g., W. Page Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: Ihe Meaning of 
"Dqedn in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
559, 563 (1969) (stating that "while strict liability obviates the necessity for 
convincing the jury as to the existence of negligence, it does not alter in any 
substantial way the plaintiff's proof problems, and the satisfaction of plaintiffs 
proof requirements for strict liability will generally result also in a finding of 
negligence. . . ."); John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 
Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965) (arguing that since "the test for imposing strict liability 
is whether the product was unreasonably dangerous, to use the words of the 
Restatement, . . . is simply a test of negligence . . . ."). 
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and biological products, a manufacturer should be strictly liable 
for defective design or formulation in long latency claims that re- 
sult in personal physical injury due to ingestion or inhalation of 
the product, other exposure to it, or to radiation emitting from 
it.6 
Regarding this category of claims, if one agrees with the 
premise that strict products liability serves an irreplaceable role, a 
second question may be asked. The second question is whether 
there is a theoretical justification, and a practical means, of af- 
fording a strict liability standard to such claims, notwithstanding 
the probable negligence analysis applied to other claims. It is to 
these two questions that I now turn to. 
I will try to sketch a preliminary case in which true strict tort 
liability can succeed and should not be abandoned to a negligence 
standard. This select group of harm categories are harms caused 
by nonmedical products that have defective formulations and 
6. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(stating whether manufacturer failed to warn the user of an unventilated glue 
pot about the fumes is to be determined by the trier of fact "consistent with the 
general trend in tort law. . . ."); Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 
F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating that a manufacturer of n defective 
product may be held liable on either a tort or warranty theory); Harnmond v. 
North American Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d 210, 216 (Ill. 1983) (stating that 
failure to warn could be a basis for holding manufacturer strictly liable); 
Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 867 (Mo. 1985) (sustaining 
plaintiffs claim that defendant corporation should be held strictly liable for 
radiation damage resulting from abnormally dangerous activity and remanding 
the case to trial court for determination on the question of liability in 
accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Torts $9 519 and 520); City of 
New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 190 A.D.2d 173, 177, 597 N.Y.S.2d 698, 
700 (1st Dep't 1993) ( lad based paint manufacturers amenable to trial and 
potential joint and several liability on claims arising from the production and 
promotion of product which young people could inhale and digest). Courts 
have, however, recognized the suggested exception for tobacco, prescription 
and alcoholic products. See, e.g., Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 
1149, 1158-59 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (rejecting strict liability claims based on n 
defect theory against cigarette manufacturer); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 
P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal. 1988) (holding that drug manufacturers are not strictly 
liable for design defects). Other commentators have expressed similar 
suggestions with respect to long latency claims. See getterally Barbara Green, 
Toxic Torts and Strict Liability, 30 AUG. HOUS. LAW. 14 (1992). 
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have been proven to cause injury through exposure, inhalation, 
radiation or infection.7 
STRICT LIABILITY, AS APPLIED TO HARM ARISING 
FROM CERTAIN PRODUCTS, SERVES IMPORTANT 
SOCIETAL OBJECTIVES 
The policy justifications for strict products liability have been 
stated as relating to: (1) compensation through loss spreading; (2) 
deterrence; (3) encouraging useful conduct; (4) amelioration of 
expensive and time consuming problems of proof; (5) protection 
of consumer expectations; and (6) cost internalization.8 
Modern application of strict products liability has been criti- 
cized in many regards.9 A principal criticism is that due to the 
7. There is authority concluding that the application of different liability 
rules to different product types violates neither the Equal Protection Clause nor 
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See In re Asbestos 
Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1244 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the denial of 
"state-of-the-artn defense to asbestos manufacturers in a products liability 
claim does not violate either constitutional clause); Gogol v. Johns-hlanville 
Sales Corp., 595 F. Supp. 971, 975 (D.N.J. 1984) (stating that since asbestos 
cases are l i e  no other products liability cases in terms of their volume, 
difficulty, and massive societal problems, denial of this defense does not 
violate equal protection). 
8. See DAVID A. FISCHER & WILLIAM POWERS, JR., PRODUCE 
LMILrrr: CASES AND MATERIALS 50, 51 (1988); Gary J. Highland, Note, 
S a h  of DeJective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. 
L. RM. 805, 811-19 (1979) (stating that "[tlhe reasons commonly given by 
the courts for applying strict liability may be grouped into five broad 
categories: enterprise liability, deterrence, risk distribution, practicality, and 
implied representation . . . ."). 
9. See, e.g., Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Re/orm by the 
Judiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 303, 306 (1992) (noting that critics of the 
products liability system contend that "the system is out of control because of 
dramatic increases in the amount of litigation and in the size of damage awards 
and because legal standards are too open-ended and unpredictable for 
business. . . ."); Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, Ihe Supreme 
Court and the Products Liability Crisis: Lessons Front Boyle's Government 
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spare phraseology of "unreasonably dangerous, defective condi- 
tion, "10 courts or legislatures in most jurisdictions have expanded 
upon the evaluation, by the court or the jury, and thereby have 
developed the so called risk-utility criteria. l l Employment of 
Contractor Defnse, 63 S. CAL. L. REV, 639, 640 n.5 (1990) ("Critics have 
argued that the expansion of products liability, along with its concomitant 
uncertainty, has driven useful products off the market, stunted incentives for 
technological innovation, and harmed the country's ability to compete in the 
international marketplace."); Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claitrts and 
the Corporate Tortfeeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative 
Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1297, 
1298 (1983) (commenting that the large awards in products liability cases 
"might bankrupt a small corporation, for which the cost of products liability 
insurance might become prohibitiven and at the same time "lead to greater 
monopolization of manufacturing fieldsn by large corporations who can afford 
such insurance); see generally Frank J. Vandall, "Desigrr Deject" in Products 
Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61 
(1982). 
10. According to comment g, a product is defective if it leaves the hmds 
of the manufacturer in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, cmt. g. This has come to be known as the 
consumer expectation test. See Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co., 411 F. Supp. 705, 706-08 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (holding that a 
product was not more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect), 
rev'd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1977). Another test used by 
courts is the risk-utility test that imputes knowledge of all risks knowable at 
the time of manufacture or sale. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict 
Tort Liability For Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973). A third 
approach uses the risk-benefit test but imputes knowledge at the time of trial. 
See Keeton, supra note 5, at 569-71. The hybrid approach uses a combination 
of the consumer expectation test and the risk-utility test. See Caterpillar 
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979) (adopting a two prong 
test in determining whether product is defective consisting of a consumer 
expectation test andlor a risk-utility analysis). But see Pyatt v. Engel Equip., 
Inc., 309 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. App. 1974) (holding that unreasonably 
dangerous does not require a definition). 
11. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Mich. 
1984) (applying the risk-utility balancing test and stating that "[tlhe competing 
factors to be weighed under [such] a . . . test invite the trier of fact to consider 
the alternatives and risks faced by the manufacturer and to determine whether 
in light of these the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in making the 
design choices it made. . . ."); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 
406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (N.J. 1979) (noting that it is the court's function to 
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risk-utility criteria, the argument goes, so pervades strict liability 
analysis as to render it indistinguishable from negligence analy- 
sis.12 For this reason, the argument concludes that to continue 
describing the liability theory as strict is simply erroneous.13 
On this basis, critics of strict products liability argue that, as 
compared to a negligence standard, strict liability adds only 
minimally to its stated tort objectives.14 They suggesf, that if the 
same objectives of compensation, loss spreading, cost internali- 
zation and satisfaction of consumer expectations are achieved 
determine whether the manufacturer had a duty to the consumer by "balancing 
. . . the nature of the risk, the public interest and the relationship of the 
parties. . . ."), superseded by statute as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252 (N.J. 1990); Cepeda v. Cumberland 
Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 825 (N.J. 1978) (acknowledging that the risk- 
utility analysis is "most usehl . . . for purposes of practical judicial 
implementation in design cases . . . ."), overruled by Surer, 406 A.2d at 150- 
51, and superseded by statute as stated in Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1252; 
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 0'4. Va. 
1979) (holding that the risk-utility analysis is useful in products liability wses 
"by setting the general contours of relevant expert testimony concerning the 
defectiveness of the product . . . ."). 
12. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (GI. 1972). In 
rejecting the unreasonably dangerous test of 9 402A, the Cronin court stated 
that the imposition of the unreasonably dangerous test in 3 402A "has 
burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of 
negligence . . . [and] places upon [the plaintiff] a significantly i n c r d  
burden and represents a step backward in the area pioneered by this court." Id. 
at 1162. 
13. Id. ("the Restatement formulation of strict liability m l y  l ads  to a 
different conclusion than would have been reached under the laws of 
negligence . . . ."). 
14. See Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Decuh of Stria 
Products Liability: Zle Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CN. L. REV. 1183 (1992). 
The commentator states that "[mlany courts, when applying strict products 
liability, have imputed the knowledge of the product's danger available at the 
time of trial to the manufacturer as of the time of the product's manufacture. 
Once this knowledge has been imputed, the standard is the snme as a 
negligence standard." Id. at 1206. She also argues that "[slome tnces of strict 
products liability remain in the form of altered burdens of p m f .  . . [but] 
[tlhese traces . . . are insufficient to fi~lfill the goals that strict products 
liability was designed to serve." Id. at 1191. 
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through application of negligence liability,15 strict tort liability 
adds little but verbiage to the administration of civil justice for 
harms caused by unreasonably dangerous products. l6 
I will try to respond to these criticisms in turn. 
Employment of Risk Utility Criteria Does Not Vitiate Strict Liabil- 
ity 
Employed appropriately, use of risk-utility evaluation does not 
trammel the concept of liability without regard to fault.17 By 
proper employment, I mean that risk-utility evaluation should re- 
tain a role in the court's threshold determination of whether or 
not the plaintiff has succeeded in presenting evidence that defen- 
dant marketed its product in an unreasonably dangerous and de- 
fective condition.18 Where plaintiff has done so, the court should 
permit jury evaluation of plaintiffs claim as to whether the prod- 
15. See Wertheimer, supra note 14, at 1206. 
16. Other writers would agree with this view. See, e.g., Irene W. 
Bruynes, Strict Liability and the Admissibility of Evidence of Subseque~it 
Remedial Measures Under Evidence Rule 407, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 333, 347-50 
(1988) (arguing that the theory of strict liability is a misnomer in products 
liability cases as unreasonably dangerous standard is closer to negligence); 
Joseph A. Page, Deforming Ton Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 663-69 (1990) 
(reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (1988)) (arguing that "strict liability" only applies to 
defective products where a negligence-type standard is used to determine if the 
product is unreasonably dangerous). 
17. Commentators are generally not comfortable with the idea of linbility 
without fault. See David P. Griffith, Note, Products Liability - Negligence 
Presumed: An Evolution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 851, 899 (1989) (arguing thnt n 
fault based standard should be used in every tort case). 
18. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., m e  Louisiana Products Liability Act: 
Making Sense of It All, 49 LA. L. REV. 629, 668 (1989) ("First the judge must 
engage in a balancing process to determine if the plaintiff has estnblished n 
prima facie case. If the plaintiff has, then the jury must determine whether, in 
its comrnon-sense opinion, the product design in question is unrensonnbly 
dangerous. "). 
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uct was dangerously defective, without reference to risk-utility 
balancing. l9 
The key distinction between strict tort liability and negligence 
analysis has always been that, in negligence analysis, the focus is 
on the care exercised by defendant, while in strict tort liability, 
the issue is the safety of the prod~ct.~o An influential device for 
appreciating and preserving this distinction has been to imagine 
that in strict tort liability, knowledge of product risks is impured 
to a defendant without regard to whether the defendant actually 
knew or should have known of the risks.21 The Oregon Supreme 
Court, in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,* explained that the 
"imputation" of knowledge operates in this way: 
A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable 
person would not put into the stream of commerce if he had 
knowledge of its hannfirl character. The test, therefore, is 
whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article 
knowing of the risk involved. Strict liability imposes what 
amounts to constructive knowledge of the condition of the prod- 
uct.= 
In other words, "[elhe [product] can have a degree of dangerous- 
ness which the law of strict liability will not tolerate even though 
19. See Galligan, supra note 18, at 669 ("Presuming knowledge of the 
plaintiffs proposed design focuses the jury's evaluation on whether the 
manufacturer's design was 'reasonably' safe."). 
20. See, e.g., Spieker v. Westgo, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 837, 841-42 (N.D. 
1992) (explaining that negligence instruction properly informed the jury as to 
the difference between negligence and strict liability); Mauch v. Manufacturers 
Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 346-47 (N.D. 1984) (noting that 
contributory negligence is not a defense in products liability action); Brown v. 
Yamaha Motor Corp., 691 P.2d 577, 579-80 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (stating 
that rejection of strict liability theory does not foreclose a finding of 
negligence). 
21. See, cg., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 
544 (N.J. 1982) (stating that unknowable risks do not relieve defendants of 
liability of the failure to warn); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d 
925, 942-43 (N.J. 1981) (stating that a products liability charge in an 
inadequate warning case must make clear that knowledge of product risks are 
imputed to the manufacturer). 
22. 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974). 
23. Id at 1036 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
Heinonline - -  10 Touro L. Rev. 131 1993-1994 
132 TOUR0 LAW REVIEW [Vol 10 
the actions of the designer were entirely reasonable, in view of 
what h e  knew at the time h e  planned and sold the manufactured 
article. n24 
T h e  critical question unresolved by these statements is what 
knowledge shall be imputed to the defendant? Should it be the 
knowledge of product risks known or knowable at the time of 
original marketing or, should knowledge of product risks known 
at the time of trial be imputed to defendant, without regard to 
whether such risks were within the spectrum of scientific knowl- 
edge at the time of marketing? The dispute is practically as old as 
section 402A itself.= Those taking the view that imputation ap- 
plies only to risks knowable at the time of sale adopt a negligence 
standard, as advanced by Dean John ~ a d e . 2 ~  Those maintaining 
that true strict liability requires imputation of even later revealed 
knowledge find support in the argument of Page ~ e e t o n , ~ ~  to 
wit, that as a consequence of assuming the defendant's 
knowledge of the dangers of the product, it is irrelevant whether 
the existence of such dangers was scientifically discoverable.28 
24. Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (Or. 1974) (stating that this 
"requisite degree" of knowledge can be defined as a "greater degree of danger 
than a consumer has a right to expect . . . ."). 
25. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 825-26 (N.J. 1978) 
(foreseeability of dangerousness is imputed to the mimufacturer), overrule(l by 
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (N.J. 
1979), and superseded by statute as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252 (N.J. 1990); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547 
P.2d 132, 142 n.12 (Or. 1976) (stating that ditnger is assumed to be 
foreseeable by the manufacturer in the law of strict products liability), 
superseded by statute as stated in Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 
642 P.2d 624, 627 (Or. 1982); Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1040 n.17 (stating that 
the law of strict products liability imputes the knowledge of risks to 
manufacturer regardless of whether manufacturer actually knows or not). 
26. See Wade, supra note 10, at 834-35; see also Beshada, 447 A.2d at 
544 (finding liability for failure to warn of risks which were unknowable)). 
27. See Keeton, supra note 5, at 569-71; see, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 
Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. 1985) (limiting liability to risks which are 
known amounts to a standard of negligence); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 550 P.2d 
1065, 1058 (Ariz. 1976) (test of unreasonable danger imputes knowledge of 
risks to the manufacturer). 
28. As another court observed, "[tlhe Wade and Keeton formulations of 
the standard appear to be identical except that Keeton would impute the 
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It is worth remembering that whether the doctrine is negli- 
gence, strict products liability or liability for abnormally danger- 
ous activities, the task is always the same: the evaluation of the 
utility of a product or a process and the risks inherent in its 
use.29 As the Oregon Supreme Court has stated, "The difference 
between the three theories of recovery is in the manner in which 
the decisional functions are distributed between the court and the 
jury."3O Specifically, in strict products liability, it is the court, 
not the jury, that must conduct a risk-utility analysis to determine 
whether the product was marketed in an unreasonably dangerous 
and defective condition.31 
What is proposed is not absolute liability.32 Absolute liability 
attaches where a defendant is liable in money damages for any 
knowledge of dangers at time of trial to the manufacturer, while Wade would 
impute only the knowledge existing at the time the product wns sold." 
Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036 n.6. See also Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 
432 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1981). In Freud, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
explained that the difference between negligence and strict liability in a failure 
to warn case is that in strict liability cases knowledge of the dangerousness of 
the product is imputed to defendants. Id. at 929-31. As the only issue was 
whether the product distributed by defendant was reasonably safe, plaintiff did 
not need to prove that defendant knew or should have known of its 
dangerousness. Id 
29. See, e-g., McWilliams v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 987 F.2d 200, 205 
(3d Cir. 1993) (requiring the application of a risk-benefit analysis as provided 
by exception to New Jersey's "open and obviousn danger defense to design 
defect claims); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304-06 (N.J. 1983) 
(discussing the use of the risk utility test), superseded by statute as shted in 
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252 (I'4.J. 1990). 
30. Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1039. 
31. See, e.g., Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1227 
(3d Cir. 1989) (stating that the trial judge must "evaluate the risks of the 
product" and its utility to determine if the case should be submitted to the jury 
on the issue of defect); OSBrien, 463 A.2d at 310 (Schreiber, J., concurring & 
dissenting) (stating that jury not cognizant of absolute liability elements 
causing decisions to reflect value judgments and lack precedentid effect); see 
also Wade, supra note 10, at 838-41. Cf. Dominick Vetri, Produds Liability 
llze Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REV. 293, 304 (1975) 
(taking the view that the jury should be instructed on the risk-utility factors). 
32. See Richard W. Wright, Causation In Tort Lmv, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
1735, 1750-51 (1985) (noting that "traditionally, absolute liability has meat  
prima facie liability based merely on causation of harm to another . . . ."). 
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harm proximately caused by a design or manufacturing defect in 
the product.33 Strict products liability differs. It is not absolute. 
As summarized by the Oregon Supreme Court: 
The manner of injury might be so fortuitous and the chances of 
injury occurring so remote that it is reasonable to sell the prod- 
uct despite the danger. In design cases the utility of the article 
may be so great, and the change of design necessary to alleviate 
the danger in question may so impair such utility, that it is rea- 
sonable to market the product as it is, even though the possibility 
of injury exists and was realized at the time of the sale 
. . . . Such an article is not dangerously defective despite its 
having inflicted injury.34 
The proof that risk-utility analysis, through imputation of 
knowledge to the defendant, is compatible with strict products li- 
ability is, as the expression goes, in the pudding. In the work of 
lawyers, the pudding is the decisional law. The courts in numer- 
ous jurisdictions, which are unequivocally committed to strict tort 
liability, nevertheless employ risk-utility analysis to permit 
meaningful evaluation of whether a product is safe.35 
- - - - - - -- 
33. See, e.g., Galbreath v. Engineering Constr. Corp., 273 N.E.2d 121, 
124 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that absolute liability is imposed where 
damage or injury is proximately caused by the use of explosives whether or not 
such damage or injury is immediate or direct); Ohler v. Davis, 298 A.2d 895, 
901 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972) (Cercone, J., dissenting) (stating that absolute 
liability applies only if the defect was a proximate cause of the injury). 
34. Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1038. 
35. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454-55 (Cal. 
1978) (holding that the design of a product may be determined to be defective 
if "the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design 
outweighs the benefits of such design. . . . *) (citation omitted); Roach v. 
Kononen, 525 P.2d 125 (Or. 1974). In Roach, the court used the following 
seven factors to make a utilitylrisk determination with respect to the product: 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user 
and to the public as a whole. 
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause 
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. 
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same 
need and not be unsafe. 
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The compatibility of risk-utility criteria with genuine strict 
products liability is most clear in jurisdictions where the court 
makes a threshold determination of whether or not the plaintiff 
has made a jury subrnissible case that a product is dangerously 
defective.36 In these settings, the risk-utility factors, stated by 
Dean John wade37 and others, are not the basis for instructions 
to the jury, but are utilized by the court to determine whether the 
a sufficient case has been made out that may be submitted to the 
j ~ r y . ~ 8  If such a case has been made out, then it is submitted to 
the jury for its determination as to what constitutes a 
"dangerously defective" product.39 
Strict Tort Liability Materially Serves Accepted Tort Policy 
Objectives 
As mentioned, a central argument against retention of strict 
products liability is that, as compared to a negligence standard, it 
adds only minimally to the stated policy objectives of compensa- 
tion, loss spreading, deterrence, cost internalization and satisfac- 
tion of consumer expectations.40 
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the 
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too 
expensive to maintain its utility. 
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use 
of the product. 
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the 
product and their avoidability, because of the general public 
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or the 
existence of suitable warnings or instructions. 
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss 
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. 
Id. at 128-29 (quoting Wade, supra note 10, at 837-38). 
36. See supra note 3 1 and accompanying text. 
37. See supra note 10, at 837-38. 
38. See supra note 3 1 and accompanying text. 
39. See Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1040. 
40. See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, Abernclrirle Compensation 
Schemes and Tort lheory: Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558, 
591 (1985). 
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Distinguished commentators have suggested that strict tort li- 
ability does not induce safer conduct on the  part of the actor.41 In 
response, I will invite attention to certain products cases, and to 
the decisions and commentary involving the related strict tort 
doctrine that apply strict products liability to abnormally danger- 
ous activities.42 While the majority of decisions rejects the appli- 
cation of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities,43 
many of the clearest statements describing the distinctive policy 
attributes of true strict liability have been made in such cases.44 
41. Sugarman, supra note 40, at 588 (citing G. Eads & P. Reuter, 
Designing Safer Products: Corporate Responses to Product Liability, LAW 
AND REGULATION 46 (1983)); see also Kurt M. Zitzer, Illinois Rejects Market 
Share Liability: A Policy Based Analysis of Smith V. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 KY. 
L.J. 617, 649 (1991) (stating that market share liability theory does not 
promote safer conduct). 
42. See, e.g., Chavez v. Southern Pac. Tmsp.  Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 
1214 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (finding that transportation of explosives is nn 
ultrahazardous activity, subjecting the camer to strict liability for resulting 
damages); M. W. Worley Constr. Co., V. Hungerford, Inc., 210 S.E.2d 161, 
164 (Va. 1974) (ruling that strict liability applies for direct damages caused by 
blasting due to its intrinsically dangerous nature provided that the injured party 
who had reason to know of the risk did not participate in injurious incident); 
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Wash. 1972) (holding that 
transportation of gasoline as freight along public highways to be an abnormally 
dangerous activity requiring imposition of strict liability for harm); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 99 519, 520 (1977). See getterally 
Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, m e  Revitalizatiorr of Hazardous Activity 
Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1987) (tracing the origins of the 
application of strict liability to abnormally dangerous activities and 
commenting on the current status of such liability). 
43. See generally M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY $9 11.2 & 
11.3 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (analyzing authority). 
44. See, e.g., Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 
F.2d 1 174 (7th Cir. 1990). In Indiana Harbor Belt R. R., the court held that 
strict liability imposed for ultrahazardous activity was inapplicable in the 
situation where leakage of a toxic and flammable chemical led to suit against 
chemical manufacturers, since the accident was due to cnrelessness and would 
be adequately deterred by the threat of liability for negligence. Id. at 1179. See 
also City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 617 
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that corporation was not strictly liable under 
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to Bloomington for damages due to 
ground water contamination, since the damage was due to the activity of third 
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Representative of the observations that strict products liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities does not clearly serve to im- 
prove conduct or to deter actors are the comments of Professors 
Henderson and  earso on^^ refemng to Atlas Chemical Co. v. 
~nderson.4~ Therein, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals reviewed 
a judgment for the plaintiff in a case involving the deliberate 
dumping by the defendant of industrial waste on sixty acres of the 
plaintiff's land.47 The court affirmed the judgment for the plain- 
tiff, concluding that strict liability would attach, under Texas 
law, when pollutants are intentionally di~charged.~~ The court 
explained that "[tlhe costs of injuries resulting from pollution 
must be internalized by industry as a cost of production and 
borne by consumers or shareholders, or both, and not by the in- 
jured individual. "49 
To the Texas Appellate Court's conclusion, Professors Hender- 
son and Pearson replied: 
nt should be clear that, in theory at least, moving from negli- 
gence to strict liability will not cause actors to act any more 
carefully. In theory, an actor such as Atlas Chemical Industries, 
Inc., will invest a socially optimal amount in pollution control 
under a regime of negligence-based liability. The losses that 
continue to occur even after such optimal investment-the 
"residual" pollution losses not deemed worth it to prevent 
through precautions because they amount to less than the costs of 
prevention-fall on the victims under a negligence rule. But even 
if the actor were held strictly liable for all pollution losses, in- 
cluding the residual losses that are cheaper to incur than to pre- 
party); Sprankle v. Bower Ammonia & Chem. Co., 824 F.2d 409, 415-16 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (applying factors From Restatement (Second) of Torts 3 520 the 
court determined that storage of anhydrous ammonia was not an abnormally 
dangerous activity). 
45. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS 
PRoc~ss 695-96 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1988). 
46. 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), afd, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 
1975). 
47. Id at 311. 
48. Id at 313. The court determined that neither "malicious nor wanton 
conductn were required in intentional discharge cases. Id. 
49. Id at 316. 
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vent, the actor would not invest more in care than he would if li- 
able only when proven negligent because the residual losses are, 
by hypothesis, cheaper to incur than to prevent. . . . [Elven un- 
der strict liability, the actor will find it cheaper to pay for the 
residual losses (through insurance, perhaps) than to pay to pre- 
vent them.50 
To this critique, I would only set forth what I believe to be the 
telling counter-argument, as it has been expressed by various 
writer~.~l The authors of the  A.L.I.'s 1991 study, entitled Enter- 
prise Responsibility for Personal 1nju@2 suggested that, in the 
context of environmental harms, "strict liability may have deter- 
rent effects superior to those produced by a negligence standard 
when the risk created by an activity is difficult to quantify but 
nonetheless sub~ tan t i a l . "~3  Other authors and judges seemingly 
concede that strict liability does affect conduct in ways not 
reached by conventional negligence analysis.54 The point was 
50. HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 45, at 695-96. See also Steven L. 
Humphreys, Comment, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate 
Polluter as a Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 3 1 1, 323-24 (1990). 
51. See, e.g., Kathleen B. Benesh, Restitution for the Nonsmoker: Holding 
the Tobacco Industry Liable for Injuries to Nonsmokers, 7 IN PUB. INTEREST 
12, 15 (1987) (suggesting that the application of strict liability under theory of 
product liability or abnormally dangerous activity will act as deterrent to the 
harm that the tobacco industry inflicts on the nonsmoker); John A. Chnnin, 
Comment, Lust on Your Corner: Strict Liability, Victim Cotnpensation, and 
Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 365, 394 (1991) 
(recommending the imposition of strict liability upon manufacturers and users 
of leaking underground gasoline storage tanks in order to provide incentives 
for such manufacturers and users to remedy their activities and improve their 
products). 
52. A.L.I., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE L I A B I L ~ " ~  FOR PERSONAL 
INJURY, Vol. 11, Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change (1991). 
53. Id. at 366 (citations omitted). 
54. See, e.g., Indiana harbor belt R.R.. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 
F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that imposition of strict linbility 
would give manufacturers an incentive to experiment with different methods to 
prevent accidents); see also Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and 
Accidettts: To Fleming James, Jr., 84 YALE L.J. 656, 666-70 (1975). 
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made by Seventh Circuit Judge and influential law and economics 
scholar Judge Richard ~ o s n e r . ~ ~  In Judge Posner's words: 
By making the actor strictly liable . . . we give him an incentive, 
missing in a negligence regime, to experiment with methods of 
preventing accidents that involve not greater exertions of care, 
assumed to be futile, but instead relocating, changing, or reduc- 
ing (perhaps to the vanishing point) the activity giving rise to the 
accident. . . . The greater the risk of an accident . . . and the 
costs of an accident if one occurs . . . the more we want the ac- 
tor to consider the possibility of making accident-reducing activ- 
ity changes; the stronger, therefore, is the case for strict liabil- 
i t y . . . .  56 
In my view, the corrective justice sentiments, permeating the 
logic of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, are 
equally applicable to my suggestion of defective design or formu- 
lation and strict products liability for long latency injuries, caused 
by toxic exposure by respiration, ingestion, dermal contact and 
radiation. It is in these particular injury categories that non-recip- 
rocal risks, created by the manufacturer and endured by the 
plaintiff, are most stark. It is also in these categories that over a 
period of time and after the introduction of hundreds of poten- 
tially injurious toxic products and processes, that the episodic 
revelation of widespread personal physical injury is seemingly 
unavoidable. And it is there that failure to provide a true strict 
products liability remedy has, and will, opemte most harshly. 
A Proposal for a Residual Domain of Strict Liability for 
Personal Physical Injury Sustained by Radiation, Inhala- 
tion or Absorption . 
Revealed risks at the time of initial research, development and 
first marketing, were not known and were truly not knowable, 
55. Richard A. Posner, Judge, United States Court of Appmls for the 
Seventh Circuit. 
56. Indiana Harbor Belr R.R.. ,916 F.2d at 1177 (citation omitted). 
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are rare indeed.57 Where they happen, and where they affect 
broad population segments, the injuries are most often related to 
toxic products or processes.58 A noteworthy example of a toxic 
exposure products liability case, in which the plaintiff prevailed 
even though the court accepted the hypothesis that the risks of 
exposure were not known at the time of marketing, is the asbes- 
tos injury decision in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products 
Corp.,59 decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1 9 8 2 . ~ ~  
We all recognize that Beshada has gained its notoriety in equal 
parts from, both, the vision of its holding, and the flat rejection 
of that vision by most jurisdictions.61 Even in its state of origin, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court later limited Beshada to its asbes- 
tos  antecedent^.^^ Please try to think of Beshnda in the context of 
its logic. This is the finite subject areas, for which I propose, that 
retain true strict torts liability and include products that, after a 
period of latency, are toxic when touched, ingested, inhaled or by 
57. Some of the instances where courts found that the risks were not 
known or knowable at the time of marketing have been in prescription drug 
cases. In such cases, some courts have refused to find strict liability on the part 
of the manufacturer. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Dn~g ,  Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 
426 (2d Cir. 1969) (refusing to find the manufacturer of prescription drug 
Aralen strictly liable where risks were not apparent at time of manufacture); 
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481 (CilI. 1988) (holding that 
manufacturers of prescription pharmaceuticals could only be liable for failure 
to warn of side effects that were known or knowable at the time of 
distribution). 
58. See Griffin v. Planter's Chem. Corp., 302 F. Supp. 937, 943-44 
(D.S.C. 1969) (holding manufacturer liable for marketing a pesticide with 
unknown toxic capabilities); Orr v. Shell Oil Co., 177 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Mo. 
1943) (holding defendant liable for supplying chemical, with questionable 
toxic capability, which led laborer to develop severe rash). 
59. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). 
60. The Opinion of the Court was delivered by Judge Pashman. 
61. See generally Andrew T. Berry, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp.: 
Revolution - Or Aberration - In Products Liability Law, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 
786, 800 (1984) (noting that the first state supreme court to consider Beshada 
rejected the decision in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 
1983)). 
62. See generally Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1099 (N.J. 
1992) (discussing the limitation of the Beshada doctrine in New Jersey). 
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radiation cause personal physical injury, excluding alcohol, to- 
bacco and prescriptive products.63 
Beshadu involved failure to warn claims brought by plaintiffs, 
some of whom were exposed to defendants' asbestos products as 
early as the 1930's.64 Defendants claimed that any duty to warn 
attached only after the risks to the worker (as distinct from previ- 
ously known risks associated with high concentration exposure in 
asbestos textile mills) became scientifically knowable.65 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court rejected this "state-of-theart" or "state of 
scientific knowability" limitation on a defendants' informational 
duty, and held that even accepting defendant's claims of justili- 
able ignorance, liability for failure to warn would attach without 
regard to when the risks became scientifically knowable.66 
The court proceeded to explain why only imposition of true 
strict tort liability could satisfy important goals of compensation, 
deterrence and judicial efficiency:67 
Risk Spreading. One of the most important arguments generally 
advanced for imposing strict liability is that the manufacturers 
and distributors of defective products can best allocate the costs 
of the injuries resulting from those products. The premise is that 
the price of a product should reflect all of its costs, including the 
cost of injuries caused by the product. This can best be accom- 
plished by imposing liability on the manufacturer and distribu- 
tors. Those persons can insure against liability and incorporate 
the cost of the insurance in the price of the product. In this way, 
the costs of the product will be borne by those who profit from 
it: the manufacturers and distributors who profit from its sale 
63. Cf: James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, Ihe Quiet 
Revolution in Products Liability An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 479 (1990) (stating that in the 1980's plaintiffs stormed 
barriers in areas such as handguns, cigarettes and alcoholic beverages 
attempting to recover on strict liability theory). 
64. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 542. 
65. Id at 542-43. 
66. Id. at 546. 
67. Id. at 547-49. 'The most important inquiry . . . is whether imposition 
of liability for failure to warn of dangers which were undiscoverable at the 
time of manufacture will advance the goals and policies sought to be achieved 
by our strict liability rules. We believe that it will." Id. at 547. 
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and the buyers who profit from its use. It should be a cost of 
doing business that in the course of doing that business an unrea- 
sonable risk was created.68 
The court conceded that there was "some truth" to the defen- 
dants' claim that the stated policies of risk spreading and cost in- 
ternalization were not advanced by true strict liability.69 Defen- 
dants had argued that since unknowable hazards "by definition 
are not predicted, the price of the hazardous product will not be 
adjusted to reflect the costs of the injuries it will produce."70 
Nonetheless, the court stated: 
[Tlhe same argument can be made as to hazards which are 
deemed scientifically knowable but of which the manufacturers 
are unaware. Yet it is well established under our tort law that 
strict liability is imposed even for defects which were unknown 
to the manufacturer. It is precisely the imputation of knowledge 
to the defendant that distinguishes strict liability from negli- 
gence.71 
A second policy justification for true strict liability, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court stated, is found in enhanced accident 
avoidance.72 In citing New Jersey precedent that strict liability 
68. Id. at 547. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
7 1. Id. (citation omitted) The court continued: 
Defendants advance no argument as to why risk spreading works better 
for unknown risks than for unknowable risks. Second, spreading the 
costs of injuries among all those who produce, distribute and purchase 
manufactured products is far preferable to imposing it on the innocent 
victims who suffer illnesses and disability from defective products. This 
basic normative premise is at the center of our strict liability rules. It is 
unchanged by the state of scientific knowledge at the time of 
manufacture. Finally, contrary to defendants' assertion, this rule will 
not cause the price and production level of manufactured products to 
diverge from the so-called economically efficient level. Rather, the rule 
will force the price of any particular product to reflect the cost of 
insuring against the possibility that the product will turn out to tm 
defective. 
Id. 
72. Id. at 547-48. 
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"is but an attempt to minimize the costs of accidents and to 
consider who should bear those costs[,]" the court noted the 
celebrated article by Calabresi & ~irschoff.~3 The article 
suggests that "the strict liability issue is to decide which party is 
the 'cheapest cost avoider,' or who is in the best position to make 
the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident 
avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made."74 
Using this approach, the court noted that "it [was] obvious that 
the manufacturer rather than the factory employee is 'in the better 
position both to judge whether avoidance costs would exceed 
foreseeable accident costs and to act on that j~dgment.'"7~ 
To defendants' argument that the logic of "cheapest cost avoi- 
der . . . has no force as to hazards which by definition were un- 
discoverable[,] "76 the court rejoined: 
Defendants have treated the level of technological knowledge at 
a given time as an independent variable not affected by defen- 
dants' conduct. But this view ignores the important role of 
industry in product safety research. The "state-of-the-art" at a 
given time is partly determined by how much industry invests in 
safety research. By imposing on manufacturers the costs of fail- 
ure to discover hazards, we create an incentive for them to invest 
more actively in safety research.77 
Continuing, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Beshada, stated 
that true strict products liability would work economies in the 
fact-finding process by avoiding laborious mini-trials on the is- 
sues of what the manufacturer knew and when the manufacturer 
learned of it.78 In the court's words: 
Factfinding process. The analysis thus far has assumed that it is 
possible to define what constitutes "undiscoverable" knowledge 
and that it will be reasonably possible to determine what knoavl- 
edge was technologically discoverable at a given time. In fact, 
73. Id at 548 (citing Guido Calabresi & John T. Hirschoff, T o n d  a Tesr 
for Sm-ct Liability in Tom, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972)). 
74. Id 
75. Id 
76. Id 
77. Id 
78. Id 
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both assumptions are highly questionable. The vast confusion 
that is virtually certain to arise from any attempt to deal in a trial 
setting with the concept of scientific knowability constitutes a 
strong reason for avoiding the concept altogether by striking the 
state-of-the-art defense.79 
Furthermore, the court elucidated: 
Scientific knowability, as we understand it, refers not to what in 
fact was known at the time, but to what could have been known 
at the time. Proof of what could have been known will inevitably 
be complicated, costly, confusing and time-consuming. Each side 
will have to produce experts in the history of science and tech- 
nology to speculate as to what knowledge was feasible in a given 
year. We doubt that juries will be capable of even understanding 
the concept of scientific knowability, much less be able to re- 
solve such a complex issue . . . . The concept of knowability is 
complicated further by the fact, noted above, that the level of in- 
vestment in safety research by manufacturers is one determinant 
of the state-of-the-art at any given time. Fairness suggests that 
manufacturers not be excused from liability because their prior 
inadequate investment in safety rendered the hazards of their 
product unknowab~e .~~  
79. Id. 
80. Id. Furtl~ermore, the Beshada court continued: 
[Dliscussion of state-of-the-art could easily confuse juries into believing 
that blameworthiness is at issue. Juries might mistakenly translate the 
confused concept of state-of-the-art into the simple question of whether 
it was defendants' fault that they did not know of the hazards of 
asbestos. But that would be negligence, not strict liability. 
Id. at 548. 
For precisely this reason, Professor Keeton has urged that negligence concepts 
be carefully avoided in strict liability cases: 
My principal thesis is, and has been, that theories of negligence should 
be avoided altogether in the products liability area in order to simplify 
the law, and that if the sale of a product is made under circumstances 
that would subject someone to an unreasonable risk in fact, liability for 
harm resulting from those risks should follow. 
W. Page Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. 
REV. 398, 409 (1970) (footnote omitted). 
As explained in 5 402A, comment j, a seller has responsibility to inform users 
of dangers which the seller knows or should have known at the time of sale. 
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Apart from the New Jersey experience with Beshada, has any 
other state court interpreted its products liability law to effect a 
"hindsight" standard? If there is such a state, how has it oper- 
ated? Washington has such a statute. The Revised Code of 
Washington section 7.72.030(1)81 provides that "[a] product 
manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant if the claimant's 
harm was proximately caused by the negligence of the manufac- 
turer in that the product was not reasonably safe as designed or 
not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instructions 
were not provided. " 82 
Two additional provisions of the Washington statute illuminate 
what is meant by the phrase "not reasonably safe." Revised Code 
of Washington section 7.72.030(1)(b) ("subsection (b)") states: 
A product is not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or 
instructions were not provided with the product, if, at the time 
of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the 
claimant's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those 
harms, rendered the warnings or instructions of the manufacturer 
inadequate and the manufacturer could have provided the warn- 
ings or instructions which the claimant alleges would have been 
adequate.83 
This statute was applied by the Washington Supreme Court in 
Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Products, co.,s4 a suit 
brought by the parents of a chid who ingested the manufacturer's 
popular baby oil, leading ultimately to cardiac arrest and to brain 
RE~TATE~~ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A cmt. j. Other commentators are in 
seeming agreement with the court that such proof would be complicated. See, 
e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responribiliry.. 
n?e Di&mma of Mass Tort Refonn, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 856 (1987) (USuch 
proof would be enormously complicated, expensive, and difficult."). With 
respect to state-of-the-art evidence, see Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fibergloss 
Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal. 1991) (explaining that the state-of-the-art 
evidence is evidence that the risk was neither known nor knowable at the time 
of sale). 
81. WASH. REV. CODE 5 7.72.030(1) (1988). 
82. Id 
83. WASH. REV. CODE 3 7.72.030(1)(b) (1988). 
84. 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash. App. 1991). 
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damage.85 Before the court was the reversal of a trial judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict following a $2.5 million jury award 
against Johnson & Johnson on the theory that it failed to provide 
adequate warnings that this product, intended for use around in- 
fants, could cause serious injury or death if ingested by a child.86 
In ruling against the trial court, the court of appeals held that 
foreseeability was not an element of a failure to warn claim under 
subsection @).87 
Affirming the court of appeals' holding that foreseeability is 
not an element of a failure to warn claim, the Washington Su- 
preme Court stated that the design defect provision, Washington 
precedent, and the legislative history of the Washington Products 
Liability Act, required it to apply strict liability to design 
claims.88 Avoiding the risk identified earlier by our colleague, 
John ~ a r g o , ~ ~  that many states permit a negligence-like analysis 
for design claims to contaminate analysis of warnings liability,gO 
the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute's warnings 
provision was also one of strict liability.91 This was true, the 
court continued, even though the statute provided a negligence- 
like balancing test for both warnings and design claims.92 The 
balancing of the warnings claim, indistinguishable from that for 
design claims, could be stated as: 
[O]n one side of the balance. . . are the likelihood that the 
product would cause plaintiffs harms or similar harms and the 
seriousness of those harms. On the other side [of the balance] are 
the adequacy of the warnings that were provided, and the ability 
85. Id. at 1339. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1344. 
88. Id. at 1345. 
89. See John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will me A.L.I. Erode Strict 
Liability In 7he Restatement (Third) For Products Liability?, 10 Tou~o L. 
REV. 21 (1993). 
90. Vargo, supra note 89, at 29-37. 
91. Ayers, 818 P.2d at 1345. 
92. Id. 
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of the manufacturer to have provided an alternative warning that 
would have prevented the injury.93 
Consequently, the court stated, as foreseeability was not an ele- 
ment of a strict liability design claim, it was not an element of a 
failure to wam claim.94 Applying the balancing test to the evi- 
dence before the jury, the court stated that "given the seriousness 
of that harm and the slight burden on the manufacturer of provid- 
ing a warning, the jury was justified in concluding that baby oil 
is a dangerous product that should have been accompanied by an 
adequate warning . "95 
Just as one swallow does not make a spring, scattered authority 
does not support a statement of doctrine. However, in this year of 
vigorous review of the bonafldes, if any, of strict products li- 
ability, I would like the flame kept alive. Claims arising from 
potentially toxic products or processes, both established and 
novel alike, are in the ascent, and each year new, wide scale in- 
juries are proven or hypothesi~ed.~~ In the past year, for exam- 
ple, consider the concern over potential long latency harm arising 
fiom proximity to a venerable symbol of industrialization, the 
electrical power line.97 Concern has been expressed that geneti- 
93. Id 
94. Id Professor Henderson cautions that Ayers on its facts involves the 
issue of foreseeability of the manner in which the injury cnme about, as 
distinct from foreseeability or scientific knowability of the type of harm the 
product may cause. He states correctly that the risk of a chemical pneumonia 
injury From baby oil within the lungs has long been known. Id. 
95. Id. at 1346. 
96. See Michael D. Green, When Toxic Worltls Collide: Regulatory and 
Common Law Presmptions for Risk Communication, 13 W. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 209, 209-10 n.2 (1989) (stating that there was more than a 700% 
increase in products liability cases filed between 1974 and 1985). See generally 
Jack L. Slobodin, Products Liability Litigation: Litigating the Toxic Ton 
Case, C396 ALI-ABA 153, 170-173 (American Law Institute 1989) (discussing 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 402A strict liability theory in toxic 
product situations and warning of inert ingredients causing the injury). 
97. See, e.g., Bill Richards, Elusive l3reat: Electric Utilities Brace For 
Cancer Lawsuits Though Risk is Unclear, WALL ST. J . ,  Feb. 5, 1993, at Al; 
Suit Seeks to Hold Iko Utilities Liable for Injuries to Family Living Near 
Substation, Tox~cs  L. REP. (BNA) No. 3 1, at 927 (Jan. 8, 1992). However, 
only very few cases dealing with tort liability over electric transmission lines 
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cally altered plants or livestock, raised for human consumption, 
will eventually be shown to cause personal physical injury.98 Re- 
quiring the plaintiffs in these and many other long latency toxic 
product personal injury claims to prove that the product risks 
were known or knowable at the time of initial marketing may 
strip the plaintiffs of a claim, even where the proof of proximate 
cause is clear. 99 Professor ~werski~OO correctly states that, in 
general, our tort law does not shift costs unless there is a good 
reason to do so. 101 I submit that placing into commerce a product 
that causes long latency, toxic physical harm, through no fault of 
the plaintiff, provides the requisite "good reason" to shift the 
costs of injuries. 
I have not meant to suggest that strategic replacement of strict 
liability by adoption of an explicit risk-utility evaluation in cer- 
tain products liability areas is not indicated, and you have today 
have been litigated. One of these cases was Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. 
Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 739 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. 1987), in which the court 
of appeals affirmed the actual damage award by the trial court, but reversed the 
punitive damage award for the erection of electrical power lines over school 
property. 
98. See Thomas 0. McGarity, International Regulation of Deliberate 
Release Biotechnologies, 26 TM. INT'L L.J. 423, 430 (1991) ("Even when 
used as designed, technologies can have unanticipated adverse health nnd 
environmental effects. . . ."); Diane E. Hoffmann, Zhe Biotechnology 
Revolution and its Regulatory Evolution, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 472-73 
(1989) ("Those who would like to see biotechnology processes and products 
more stringently regulated have argued that biotechnology is n new technology 
with dangers and risks never before confronted by our society."). 
99. See, e.g., Dana K. Astrachan, Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass 
Corp.: Asbestos Manufacturers and Strict Liabiliy: Just How Strict is It 7, 23 
PAC. L.J. 1807, 1859 (1992) (noting that proof of knowledge or knowability 
increases the cost of litigation and consequently discourages toxic injury suits). 
100. See Aaron D. Twerski, From A Reporter: A Prospective Agenda, 10 
Tou~o L. REV. 5 (1993). 
101. See Vargo, supra note 89, at 54. 
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heard many good reasons for such a reassessment. However, with 
regard to certain products, I believe that strict liability ought to 
mean what its name suggests, at least the discrete realm of prod- 
uct risks I have described. A manufacturer should be held liable 
for harm caused to users, consumers and foreseeable bystanders 
without regard to what that or other manufacturers knew, or 
should have known, about product risks. To repeat, in the finite 
categories, that I propose, such a rule retains a manifest fairness. 
For products that cause long latency personal physical injuries, 
by defective formulation and consequent toxicity by touch, 
ingestion, inhalation, infection or radiation, excluding alcohol, 
tobacco and prescriptive products, elimination of the state-of-the- 
art defense or the state of scientific knowledge defense, and im- 
position of true strict tort liability, would preserve the progress of 
section 402A where anything less would not adequately protect 
injured individuals. 
The Reporters and the A.L.1 need not endorse this potential 
preservation and rarefication of true strict products liability with 
regard to these toxic harms. Rather, to permit the common law to 
continue to take shape in this finite area, it would be optimal for 
the Reporters' notes to state explicitly that the A.L.1 takes no 
position as to preserving or creating true strict liability for defec- 
tive formulation, as to long latency product risks caused by inha- 
lation, contact, ingestion, or radiation, excluding alcohol, to- 
bacco and prescription products. 
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